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Abstrak
Tiongkok sedang mengalami fase pembangunan ekonomi yang begitu cepat dan dinamis didorong
oleh pesatnya laju industrialisasi. Permintaan energi dalam jumlah besar telah membuka jalan bagi
Tiongkok untuk mengimpor energi dari negara kaya sumber daya alam. Dalam konteks ini, Tiongkok
melakukan diplomasi ekonomi ke berbagai belahan dunia termasuk Angola yang merupakan salah
satu negara kaya sumber daya alam di Afrika. Perhatian utama penelitian ini adalah diplomasi
ekonomi Tiongkok yang dianggap sebagai bentuk neokolonialisasi di era globalisasi saat ini.
Pertanyaan utama yang akan dijawab dalam penelitian ini adalah mengapa diplomasi ekonomi
Tiongkok terhadap Angola merupakan neokolonialisasi. Untuk menjawab hal tersebut, penelitian ini
menggunakan teori Neokolonialisme dalam membedah Diplomasi Ekonomi Tiongkok terhadap
Angola. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi kasus yang
menggunakan data sekunder. Oleh karena itu, interpretasi penulis menjadi dasar dalam penelitian
ini. Penelitian ini berkesimpulan bahwa diplomasi ekonomi Tiongkok terhadap Angola merupakan
bentuk neokolonialisasi karena sarana ekonomi yang dijalankan Tiongkok terhadap Angola membuat
Tiongkok memiliki kontrol atas politik, ekonomi, dan sumber daya alam Angola secara tidak langsung,
yang pada akhirnya menimbulkan ketergantungan Angola terhadap Tiongkok.

Kata kunci:
Angola, Tiongkok, Diplomasi Ekonomi, Neokolonialisme

Abstract
China is experiencing a fast and dynamic phase of economic development driven by its fast pace
of industrialisation. The vast energy demand has pushed China to import energy from other
countries with plentiful natural resources. To this aim, China conducts economic diplomacy
worldwide, including Angola, a country with plentiful natural resources in Africa. The main
concern of this research is China's economic diplomacy which is considered as a form of
neocolonialism in this globalisation era. Therefore, the research question of this research is why
China's economic diplomacy towards Angola constitutes neocolonialisation. To this aim, this
study utilises the Neocolonialism theory in dissecting China's Economic Diplomacy against
Angola. This study uses qualitative method with a case study approach using secondary data.
Thus, the basis for this research is the author's interpretation. This research concludes that
China's economic diplomacy towards Angola constitutes neocolonialisation since the economic
means that China exerts on Angola enables China to indirectly control Angola's politics, economy
and natural resources, which in turn leads to Angola's dependence on China.

Keywords:
Angola, China, Economic Diplomacy, Neocolonialism
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INTRODUCTION
In the economic globalisation era, neocolonialism is one of many essential discourses
regarding great countries’ activities within the global economy. By implementing a
critical and in-depth analysis, there is an underlying effort to maintain neocolonialism
activities behind the notion of globalisation, especially in the economic aspect.
Neocolonialism in the globalisation era can be exemplified by the increased dependency
of the inferior countries toward the superior ones. The dependency may take many
forms, such as politics, development, investment, technology, and economy. We can
trace such asymmetrical relations back to Western colonialism in underdeveloped
countries. Even today, the ex-colonised countries are constantly trapped within the
structure, which causes them to be reliant on the superior countries.
However, today’s colonialism does not involve physical violence or colonies’
establishment. Instead, it seeks domination through simpler means by using economic
instruments, which are recognised as neocolonialism. we understand neocolonialism as
further capitalist practices and globalisation to impose control, instead of indirect
military and political domination. The control takes in many shapes: economy, cultural
promotion, language, or media in the colonised territories (Nkrumah, 1965). However,
the control is aimed at economic dominance, as showed by the inferior country’s
dependency on capital owned by the superior ones. Their poor economic structure
indeed causes dependency. Prominent countries seek to fulfil their domestic needs and
achieve their national interests through economic instruments.
In international relations, neocolonialist practices correlate with the concept of
economic diplomacy, which is utilised to accomplish national interests. The term
economic diplomacy has existed since World War II, when colonising countries were
losing their dominance while the colonised countries needed economic support. The
superior countries, therefore, sought to sustain its position through various means,
mainly by providing economic help (Jati, 2013). Economic diplomacy is an important
part of the country’s economic foreign policy to improve its economic capacity and
maintain its position at the international stage. Economic diplomacy practices include
attracting foreign investment, increasing export, and taking part in an international
economic organisation (Baranay, 2009). Today, economic diplomacy has become more
significant for countries as it could maximise the benefit of globalisation. Whereby,
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States’ interactions pursue economic interest as top priority, achieved either by formal
or informal diplomacy.
Neocolonialism is usually carried out through economic or monetary
instruments such as development assistance and support, technological and scientific
assistance, as well as foreign aid or foreign direct investment (Nkrumah, 1965). In the
current era of globalisation, foreign capital could be camouflaged as a part of economic
diplomacy, which becomes a tool for Neocolonialisation. The result of
neocolonialisation, camouflaged as economic diplomacy, is that foreign capital is used
for exploitation rather than for the economic development of less developed countries.
Foreign aid and investment provided to neocolonial countries often made them subject
to the economic and (sometimes) political will of foreign donors. In other words, the
practice of neocolonialism in economic diplomacy have increased (rather than reduced)
the gap between rich and poor countries (Nkrumah, 1965).
To further understand neocolonialism within economic diplomacy practices,
this paper discusses cooperation between China and Angola as a study case. China's
economic surge has been significantly affecting its energy demand to fulfil its domestic
industrial needs since the economic growth is linear with energy consumption. Hence,
China is required to rethink its foreign policy comprehensively and strategically in
order to both meet its energy demand and expand its market (Holslag, 2010). Natural
resources potential within a country has been industrial countries' strategic interest,
including China. Developing countries are commonly the leading destinations for
energy exploration. In Africa, China has engaged Angola as its strategic partner as
Angola has abundant natural resources, especially crude oil. Furthermore, most people
in Angola are considered as middle-income, which is beneficial for China's market
expansion effort (Oktapiani, 2015).
The writers see that China’s intensively used economic diplomacy towards
Angola shows a symptom colonialism. China has intensified its support for many
African countries for the last decades by offering interest-free loans, investment in the
monetary sector, automotive, mining, and telecommunication (Mlambo, 2018). As a
country facing a lack of technological support for natural resources processing and
national development, Angola has inevitably become dependent on China’s
investment. Thus, this paper mainly focuses on Angola’s continuous dependency on
China. As China’s mission in Angola has great significance and its growing influence
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shows that the emerging economic power would be a dominant player on the continent,
including in Angola. China’s influence can be considered as a firm statement for
China’s spread of global influence (Holslag, 2010). China’s rapid involvement within
Angola’s national development and its success to influence the latter’s political elitists
have posited China as a dominant foreign influence in Angola. This issue is important
to be examined deeper because Angola consequently sees China as an economic
success and as a trustworthy partner in tackling poverty as well as improving welfare.
Unfortunately, China considers Angola as a potential exploitation territory that is
important to be subjugated for China’s domestic needs, which the author will show in
the discussion part.
Against this background, the authors proposed a research question, “why is
China’s economic diplomacy towards Angola considered as neocolonialist practice in this
globalisation era?” We divided this article into three parts. First, the theoretical
framework explains the general concepts of economic diplomacy, neocolonialism, and
the relationship between the two. Second, we explained the research method. Third, the
results and analysis sections that explain China’s economic diplomacy towards Angola
and its assessment utilising the concept of neocolonialism.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This article needs critical approach to analyse China’s economic diplomacy toward
Angola. We have to build a theoretical framework and method to map out and address
the research question. This research uses the concept of economic diplomacy that
combined with neocolonialism concept. In this section, we will explain our theoretical
basis to analyse our topic.
Economic Diplomacy
Economic diplomacy is a crucial factor of a country's economic development as an
attempt to accomplish foreign policy objectives (Baranay, 2009). However, the exact
definition of the concept remains uncertain. Economic diplomacy refers to a series of
activities by states and non-state actors in the real world which involves process and
method within international decision-making related to trans-boundaries economic
activities, such as investment, loan, aid, export, import, and migration (Bergeijk &
Moons, 2009). Another scholar argues that economic diplomacy is considered as a
negotiation process and policy formulation to exchange goods, services, labour,
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production, and investment in other countries (Rashid, 2005). Moreover, policies
regarding the exchange of money, information, and foreign aid is also identified as
economic diplomacy (Odell, 2000). In brief, economic diplomacy discusses diplomatic
relations, cooperation, multifaceted trade, and ways to influence external economic
policy.
Combining those scholars’ definitions of economic diplomacy, this paper
perceives economic diplomacy in general as practices and strategies of a country’s
foreign relations that involve trade cooperation activities, foreign investment, foreign aid
and loan to accomplish foreign policy objectives. These three instruments of economic
diplomacy will be utilised in assessing China's economic diplomacy activities to Angola.
Export-Import activities play a vital role in preserving international business
position. Not only in terms of foreign exchange flows, but also for its significant
contribution to national income. The massive growth of international trade is one of the
many consequences of globalisation. A country can easily import its needs from other
countries and export its products abroad (Friedman, 2002). Furthermore, economic
development obliges strategic roles of capital creation. This capital formation originates
from foreign investment activities which is the primary key of international economic
integration since foreign investment enables long-term and stable economic relations
between countries. Besides, it is also crucial for governments to provide and receive
foreign economic assistance for their national development. For the creditor country,
bilaterally, granting foreign loans can be used as a mean to influence the debtor country’s
policy so that it favours the creditor’s interest (Nye, 2004). This relation is executed
within economic diplomacy activities. Hence, economic diplomacy is defined as 'the use
of political means as leverage in international negotiations to enhance national economic
prosperity and the use of economic leverage to increase the political stability of the
nation’ (Okano-Heijmans, 2011).
Neocolonialism
The history of structural colonialism has led to the development of many novel ideas and
perspectives regarding world order. Along with the dynamics of international
interactions, colonialism emerges in various forms and continually transforms and
develops. This paves the way for the study of International Relations to expand its
research to adapt with the current dynamics, including constructing new theories. One of
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the theories that emerge in the contemporary world related to colonialism is
neocolonialism theory.
The terminology of 'neocolonialism' was first introduced by Kwame Nkrumah,
the first post-independence president of Ghana (1960-1966) and has been discussed by
many scholars and philosophers in the 20th century, including Jean-Paul Sartre and Noam
Chomsky. Kwame Nkrumah coined the term, which appeared in the preamble of the
African Union Charter in 1963, and became the title of his book, Neo-Colonialism: The
Last Stage of Imperialism (1965). Nkrumah theoretically developed and extended the
post-War socio-economic and political arguments advanced by Lenin in the Imperialism:
The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917).
According to Nkrumah, neocolonialism refers to the new practice of conquest
within African economic, social, cultural, and political life in which the idea is to impose
foreign control over the economy and politics in the territory. However, the foreign
control is invisible-- countries seem like they are independent and have complete control
over its own domestic affairs (Nkrumah, 1965). In the guise of providing development
support, technological, as well as scientific assistance, the former colonial rulers impose
political control and cultural hegemony that create neocolonialism (Serequeberhan,
1998). Neocolonialism is a kind of modern colonialism, which is a mechanism used to
maintain one’s dependency. Therefore, the authors conclude that there are three main
characteristics of neocolonialist practices, namely indirect economic and political control
through the enforcement of economic and monetary means, such as economic aid or
investment, and also a constant dependency of inferior countries towards its superiors.
These characteristics of the neocolonialism concept will direct this research to reveal the
neocolonialist practices within China's economic diplomacy towards Angola.
Neocolonialist countries practice indirect control, mainly through economic
policy, monetary policy, transnational trade of companies, global institutions, or
multilateral relations (Halperin, 2007). A nation can be consequently enslaved by the
shackles of neocolonialism and simultaneously considered itself as theoretically
independent. However, it is trapped by international sovereignty thus it is directed by
external power politically and economically. Therefore, neocolonialism produces a
situation where a party possesses economic control, resulting in indirect power in a
particular territory or state. Generally, such practice evidently involves a wellcoordinated effort by the former colonial administration and the developed countries to
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hinder the growth of the developing countries that will enable them to maintain their
power over the developing countries’ raw materials and cheap labours (Nkrumah, 1965).
As mentioned earlier, neocolonialism is usually conducted through economic and
monetary means. This type of neocolonialist practice is undertaken by providing foreign
aid or foreign direct investment which involves strict regulations enforcement. These
regulations ultimately cause the recipient countries to be more vulnerable to
neocolonialism, thus the donors can easily penetrate their economic and political
influence. Furthermore, investment under neocolonialism apparently contributes to the
wider gap between rich and poor countries instead of minimising it (Nkrumah, 1965).
Neocolonialism, therefore, has been broadly understood as the further development of
capitalism which enables the capitalists (either from state or non-state actors) to dominate
their subjects through international capitalism practice rather than through direct
governance. As mentioned by Serequeberhan:
“Neocolonialism method and practice lie within its guise to command the
independent colonies' leaders to accept development assistance and support
through which imperial power tends to continue penetrating and controlling their
former colonies. With development assistance and support, technological and
scientific assistance in cover, the former colonial rulers impose their hegemonic
control over the colonies' politics and culture in the shape of neocolonialism”
(Serequeberhan in Afisi, 2017).
In his book, Neo-Colonialism: the Last Stage of imperialism, Nkrumah
highlighted the dependency phenomena that constantly occurred among newly
independent countries in Africa (Nkrumah, 1965). The term of neocolonialism was
initially used after World War II to refer to the perpetual dependency of the colonies
towards foreign power. Nonetheless, the understanding of the concept is expanded to
where the developed countries try to build influence like the colonial era. Most of African
states are considered neocolonial states, concerning their high dependency on
international capital due to their vulnerable economic structures (Attah, 2013). The
colonisers are the capitalists, aiming to gain and exploit the land of their colonies,
dominating the indigenous people and implementing new production methods. These
practices can be traced back to the period of trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism.
Through neocolonialism, countries with advanced technological capacity ensure their
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involvement within the low-income countries' activities. Thus, this relation practically
ruin the potential of further development of smaller countries and contribute to the capital
acquisition of the developed countries (Parenti, 2011).
Neocolonialism is the new form of traditional colonialism that is intended to
obtain benefit from the considerably weak and newly independent countries—and
decolonisation to attain cultural, economic, and political benefits by inflicting political
power towards the elitists (Haag, 2011). This means that the countries are not only
economically dependent on primary goods, the impact of foreign loan and aid, but also
on economic domination by a great multinational corporation. Critics argue that
neocolonialism is operating through multinational corporation investment, which
temporarily enriches the developing countries, ultimately causes the developing countries
to become fully dependent on foreign parties. Such investments also serve to cultivate
underdeveloped countries as a source of cheap labour raw materials.
The Relation Between Neocolonialism and Economic Diplomacy
Neocolonialism is not limited to great colonial powers. Today, it would rather expand to
any rich and developed country that tries to penetrate its influence through policy
enforcement on poor countries and less-developed countries (Nkrumah, 1965).
Neocolonialism possesses a general character as the deviation of national power—
politics, economy, or military—which used corruptly by dominating power to cleverly
force the dominated sectors of the conquered society to do their bidding. In other words,
neocolonialism is characterised by a new shape of imperial ruling in which there is a
game dominated by foreign capital (Attah, 2013). In many cases, African countries
voluntarily allow their countries to be highly dependent on foreign capital, a necessary
legitimation for neocolonialism. Nkrumah states that neocolonialism is generally done
through economic or monetary means, such as foreign loans or foreign direct investments
(Nkrumah, 1965). In today’s globalisation era, foreign capital is wrapped in economic
diplomacy activities as a further instrument of neocolonialism.
Such cases can be exemplified by relations between China and Venezuela when
Venezuela was governed by Hugo Chavez in 1999 to Nicola Maduro in 2013. In 2001,
the connection between the two countries was increasingly intensified, signified by a
strategic partnership of joint development. China offered many agreements in various
sectors and loans through China Development Bank (CDB). Additionally, the loans
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provided by China were expected to be paid by exporting Venezuela's oil to China.
China-Venezuela relations were further strengthened to the 2013 Nicolas Maduro
administration.
During the oil price crisis in 2014, Venezuela was not prepared for such an event
because of its high dependence on the oil industry (Amelie, 2014). Hence, during the
crisis, China was willing to provide Venezuela with a foreign loan. In exchange,
Venezuela was required to pay by exporting its oil to China (Tiezzi, 2015). Not only did
China enforce such policy to Venezuela for its oil needs, but China also intended to
expand its market, particularly in the agricultural and transportation sectors. Intense
cooperation between China and Venezuela indicates China's presence to dominate
Venezuela and become dominant power (Troush, 1999).
Economic diplomacy refers to transnational activities related to economic
activities, either trade or loan (Bergeijk & Moons, 2009). Economic diplomacy is closely
tied to the use of economic instrument towards other countries. Even though it seems
very positive, if the relation between the parties involved works asymmetrically, it could
possibly lead to neocolonialism, since what is at stake within these economic diplomacy
activities are broad national interests. This also includes political and strategic
dimensions and achieving economic security in the anarchical system. If economic
security is understood as economic welfare and political stability, then a government's
economic diplomacy will involve instruments that are either relatively economic or more
political in nature. In other words, economic diplomacy consists of economic logic
(business-end) and political logic (power-play end). Hence, economic diplomacy can be
concluded as the use of political means as leverage in international negotiations to
enhance national economic prosperity and the use of economic leverage to increase the
political stability of the nation (Okano-Heijmans, 2011).
Economic diplomacy's success lies in the consolidation of influence optimisation,
asset utilisation, and control over political climate (Bergeijk & Moons, 2009). These
aspects are what makes economic diplomacy towards the host country may change to
neocolonialism considering the presence of effort to generate influence and control the
host country by various economic instruments. Neocolonialist practice turns into reality
once a country experience intensified dependency on international financial capital due
to its vulnerable economic structure (Attah, 2013). According to this reason,
neocolonialism can be categorised as a new form of exploitation and colonial rule over
the newly independent African states, and other African states with ill economic
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structure. Through neocolonialism, states with advanced technology ensure their
involvement within the activities of the low-income states. Hence, this relation practically
ruins any development potential of the less-developed countries and contributes to the
capital acquisition of the developed ones (Parenti, 2011). Involvement as such is
conducted through development aid and support, as well as technological and scientific
assistance to impose political control and cultural hegemony in the form of
neocolonialism (Serequeberhan, 1998).
As the result of neocolonialism through economic diplomacy, foreign capital is
considerably used as an effective tool of exploitation rather than as development support
for the underdeveloped countries. Fundamentally, the loans and investments provided for
neocolonial countries often subject them to the foreign donors' economic and sometimes
political will. In other words, neocolonialism activities within economic diplomacy is
widen up the gap between the rich and poor countries, instead of reducing the world’s
disparities (Nkrumah, 1965).
RESEARCH METHOD
China chose Angola as a strategic partner to obtain its energy supply because Angola is
one of the African countries with abundant natural resources, especially oil, and most of
the population has lower middle income, which means it is a potential market for China
export (Oktapiani, 2015). In addition, Angola is one of the largest oil-producing countries
on the African continent. Angola also has high-quality oil (light crude) with low sulfur
and contains hydrocarbons, which makes Angolan oil special (Oktapiani, 2015).
Researchers must be able to explore the substance and facts both in details and
holistically. The lack of discussion regarding the neocolonialism concept has encouraged
the researchers to explore the topic thoroughly. This makes this study explorative in
character. This research is conducted qualitatively which aims to explain and examine
the hypothesis of the research variables. Qualitative research with an explorative pattern
intends to unpack the underlying causes of the inconsistencies between facts and existing
norms.
This aligns with Creswell’s argument that qualitative research highly depends on
the information either from the object or participants, such as common questions, broad
scope, collecting data from participants, and analysing, explaining words, as well as
conducting research subjectively (Creswell, 2014). First, this method is well-suited in
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explaining the issue regarding the reality of China's economic diplomacy towards Angola
to achieve its national interests. Second, the theoretical constraints to explain the
development of the neocolonialism concept. Third, a deeper understanding regarding
neocolonialism in the globalisation era through economic diplomacy practices by a
particular state is necessary. Fourth, variables of social phenomena, such as
neocolonialist practices within this study, cannot be described and quantified through
numerical forms such as in quantitative research. However, the presence of such a social
phenomenon persists, and the result is in descriptive data.
This research is conducted using a case study approach that explores the limited
system or in-depth specific case, detailed information, and data collection about
neocolonialist practices within economic diplomacy (Creswell, 2014). Robert K. Yin, an
American political scholar, defined the case study approach as empirical examination
regarding contemporary phenomena once there is a faint line between phenomenon and
context (Yin, 2013). The descriptive method is directed to describe, find, or analyse the
critical phenomenon, patterns, or different impacts of different practices over a certain
period (Dudovskiy, 2016).
The case study approach is apt to provide a better understanding of neocolonialist
practices within economic diplomacy. The selected case should be perceived as a critical
case, which enables analytical generalisation, meaning if a theory is not valid for that
case, it will not also be valid for other cases. Ultimately, the objective of a critical study
case is to verify the theory’s success used in the selected case (Patton, 2014). Therefore,
if the theory being used to examine the Angola case fails to provide validation, then it is
likely for the approach to be invalid of other cases of African countries.
Data Collection Method
In this research, the data collection technique emphasises secondary data, based on
already available data by conducting a literature review or study of previous research
relevant to the problem being analysed. This secondary data is not only consisted of other
data collected by other researchers, but also official statistics collected by governmental
institutions. These data are accumulated through a literature review which is aimed at
obtaining a theoretical basis and secondary data that can be used in answering research
questions. The secondary data are obtained from books, study cases of academics,
scientific journals, non-governmental organisations’ (NGO) reports, political documents,
and institutions' website. This research also uses publication media, such as news articles
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and other related credible articles from the internet. It is worthy to note that arguments,
facts, and opinions regarding the secondary data will further shape our understanding and
interpretation of the behaviour of China's relation and involvement in Angola.
Furthermore, the collected data was analysed using the Miles and Huberman
model, namely data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion drawing/verification.
The data that has been analysed is then explained and interpreted in the form of words to
describe the facts in the field, meaning or to answer research questions which are then
taken from the essence.
DISCUSSION
Trade Cooperation as an Instrument of Economic Diplomacy
Over the past six years, China has become the second largest oil importer from Angola
after the United States, representing about 9.3 to 30% of Angola's total oil exports (Banco
Nacional de Angola, 2007). Although the US is leading in Angolan oil imports, since
2002 Angolan oil exports to China have increased sevenfold, compared with only 3.5
times to the United States (Portugal News, 2007). Angola's oil exports to China totalled
US$3.9 billion in 2004, making it a major supplier and ranking third after Saudi Arabia
and Iran. In 2005, Angola surpassed Iran with total exports of 17.46 million tons, 45.5%
of China’s African oil imports (Xinhua, 2006). During the first six months of 2006,
Angola temporarily leapfrogged Saudi Arabia as the largest crude oil supplier to China,
with 23.45 million tonnes of crude shipped from the country of Angola that year. Oil
imports from Angola now represent more than 18% of China's total oil imports, and this
proportion is increasing.
In recent years, Chinese exports to Angola have also experienced a significant
increase. In 2004, China became Angola's fourth-largest trading partner with US$194
million, up from being the seventh-largest trading partner the previous year. In 2006,
China maintained its position even though Chinese exports to Angola quadrupled, with
steel and iron bars, batteries, cement, and automobiles being the main goods (AICEP,
2007).
After entering OPEC, Angola exported about 465,000 barrels of oil per day to
China in the first six months of 2007 and oil from Angola could account for 16% of
China's oil imports. China imports crude oil from Angola, while Angola imports
transportation, steel, electricity, and electronic products. Compared to other countries,
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Angola accounts for 16% or 788,000 barrels per day of the total oil supply from outside
China.
Angola has consistently experienced a large trade surplus with China, due to the
rapidly increasing pace of China's oil imports. Currently, it has accounted for almost 50%
of Angola's oil exports to China which beat Saudi Arabia as China's single largest
supplier. In 2014, Angola exported around 1.65 million barrels per day of crude oil of
which about half was exported to China and the increase in the number of Angola's oil
exports to China continued to consistently increase in the following years.
Foreign Investment as an Instrument of Economic Diplomacy
China's investment portfolio concentrates fully on energy and raw materials,
infrastructure, and high technology. For China, energy and raw materials are needed to
sustain economic growth. Meanwhile, roads, bridges, and dams are also very important
for the growth of developing countries. Therefore, investment in infrastructure allows
China to win over resources from developing countries. Although China's largest
operations in Angola are concentrated in oil exploration and construction, there has also
been an increase in Chinese non-oil FDI to Angola as a whole.
Figure 1. China’s FDI to Angola by Sector (2005–2007), Oil and Diamonds excluded
Sector

Investment
(in thousands
of US$)

Construction

41,301

Industry

21,573

Commerce

1,204

Transport

7,070

Real Estate

510

Extractive

500

Industry
Fisheries

1,478

Source: The Angolan National Agency for Private Investment (ANIP) (2007). Retrieved 3 January 2020
from https://www.csis.org/analysis/angola-and-china-pragmatic-partnership

By December 2007, 51 Chinese companies were registered with The Angolan
National Agency for Private Investment (ANIP). More than 50% of these companies are
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engaged in construction and others are involved in the retail trade of food products,
manufacture of rubber products, bottled mineral water, and other light industries
(Campos & Vines, 2007). Between 2005 and 2007, 50 projects worth US$73.6 million
were approved by ANIP and are being worked on by Chinese companies.
Foreign Loan Assistance as an Instrument of Economic Diplomacy
After the conflict in Angola, China began to pay attention to providing foreign aid to
Angola. Although the direct capital flows coming from oil exploitation are high, it is not
sufficient to meet the expenditure needs of Angola. Therefore, the Angolan government
struggled to secure a sustainable flow of loans from international financial institutions.
At the time when Angola was experiencing financial problems, China came up with the
characteristics of preferential loans granted without these traditional conditions. China
only needs recognition, granting 70% of contracts funded with Chinese loan money to
Chinese construction companies (Corkin & Burke, 2006), and the right to exploit
Angolan oil (Tukumbi, 2011). The large amount of credit granted by China to Angola
was carried out under an oil-backed loan agreement, which means that the credit was paid
by Angola in the form of oil exports to China (Alves, 2010).
The development and infrastructure programs of Angola have been financed
directly by the Chinese government through the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim
Bank), CDB, CITIC Group Corporation, and Chinese public and private sector agencies
and corporations, which are soft power instruments of China's foreign policy with the
aim of obtaining natural resources (Eberling, 2017). The cooperation that had been agreed
between China and Angola was immediately followed by the provision of foreign aid in
the form of loans by China through the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank) in the
first quarter of 2004 amounting to US$2 billion to fund the reconstruction of Angola's
infrastructure which was destroyed in the entire country due to civil war (Alves, 2010).
This funding continued in the following years, US$2 billion in 2006, US$500 million in
2007, and US$6 billion in 2010 (Corkin, 2011).
In 2005, the Angolan government and Exim Bank signed 12 individual credit
agreements related to the US$2 billion loans. The agreement was intended to support
various projects (Corkin & Burke, 2006). In January 2005, Exim Bank extended a US$1
billion oil-backed credit line to Angola, before it increased to US$3 billion in March
2006, making China the largest player in Angola's post-war reconstruction process
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(Corkin & Burke, 2006). The payable loan at 1.7% interest rate over 17 years, which is
managed by Angola, is intended to help rebuild critical infrastructure. In exchange,
Angola will provide China with 10,000 barrels of oil per day (Tukumbi, 2011). This
agreement is important, especially because Angola at the time of the agreement, had
difficulty in obtaining capital from international financial institutions such as the Paris
Club, IMF, and World Bank (Corkin & Burke, 2006).
Indirect Control over Angola’s Economy and Politic through China’s Economic
Diplomacy Instrument
China's increased presence in Africa intends to exercise various diplomatic instruments
and substantial state's finances to facilitate the access and operation for Chinese business
(Gu et al., 2016). For instance, oil and gas state-owned enterprises are usually perceived
as political instruments to seek benefit in a potential country through foreign direct
investment. As state-owned companies, they are prone to be controlled by the
government for both international and domestic agenda (Victor et al., 2012). Such
network later facilitates the flow of information, encourages collaboration in policy
formation and implementation, and offers considerable incentives for the leaders within
the system. Gu et al. (2016) argued that business’ success eventually leads to political
achievement and vice versa. Therefore, China-dominated corporations in Africa possess
their own interests and more accessible information on a country’s state hydrocarbon
resource and its world market valued sources.
Many of China's state-owned and private corporations in Angola intend to gain
access to national development assistance projects—directed for their own personal
interests—through contacts with local politicians and other political elites in Angola
(Corkin, 2012). This leads to foreign intervention in Angola’s internal politics as verified
by an MFL official and a former Angolan diplomat (Corkin, 2012). Hence, China has
been penetrating its influence within Angola’s domestic affairs, which is now growing
significantly.
Built from 1991 to 2010, Angola had an interim democratic constitution. In 2012,
Angola’s constitution started to comprise of dictatorial elements (Aidoo, 2013).
Henceforth, Angolan people are unable to elect their own president and vice president
because the election is determined by the most of political parties in the parliament.
Angola’s president, José Eduardo dos Santos from MPLA (1979-2017), had controlled
Angola since he and the MPLA took over the administration in Angola (Vasquez, 2019).
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Democratic development in the country has been on the decline since then. Nonetheless,
China's official press agency, Xinhua News Agency, described the new constitution as
democratic, modern, and positive, thereby supporting Angola's president, dos Santos,
despite him being an authoritarian ruler. This indicates that China supports Angola’s
authoritarian leader because it can benefit China's interests in the country.
Dos Santos fully controlled Angola’s strategic energy resources, which are
considered the second-largest oil reserve in the African sub-Sahara and the most
significant natural gas reserve in Africa (Thompson, 2012). There is an idea that China
may possibly support whoever controls this vital resource. These resources are very
important for China thus states should be wary of China's significant support towards
their country's constitution, institutions, or authoritarian leaders. The intensification of
Chinese political interference was widely observed to be low. However, the reality has
shown otherwise. China is proved to be able to influence local political decision-makers
by asking them to do a little favour for China as China promises to provide little political
support for the Angolan leaders.
According to Walter Russel Mead, a country’s economic success directly results
in increased political influence and mutual trust from other countries. Mead also argued
that economic power is naturally more binding because countries that adopt the same
economic policies and systems will find it more difficult to leave the system (Kuchins,
2009). In China's case, the state is experiencing economic robustness, which is used as
the primary instrument to gain developing countries' confidence. Welfare and money are
more appealing and, referring to Nye, can turn into a normative force as well as a tool for
penetrating ideas and culture. Persuasion is always more effective than coercion (Nye,
2004).
This characteristic of neocolonialism explains that control over less-developed
countries is carried out through indirect means. Neocolonial rule is seen to be operated
through indirect control, primarily through economic and monetary policy, trade of
transnational corporations, and other global and multilateral institutions (Halperin, 2007).
This is usually done by indirectly controlling the economic and political practices of
newly independent states, instead of imposing military control as it was during the
colonial era. Neocolonialism, therefore, is defined as the sustained colonial systems in
independent African countries by transforming these countries into victims of political,
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mental, economic, social, military, and technical domination through subtle and nonviolent means (Parenti, 2011).
In 2005, Angola proposed US$2 billion loan from China. China, however, was
willing to fulfil Angola’s request under several requirements: China was to hold the rights
to 10.000 barrels of oil per day and 70% of all contracts must be held by Chinese
companies (Tukumbi, 2011). China's strategy to provide a large amount of loan is aimed
at widening its opportunities as well as benefits of Angola’s natural resources
exploitations. Simultaneously, China intended to improve its own economy (Tukumbi,
2011). Once these features are understood, it is easier to unpack the sense of China’s
interests in offering valuable capital to Angola without any demanding preconditions,
unlike the Western Countries. This also clarifies how Angola replaced Saudi Arabia’s
position in 2010 as China’s biggest crude oil supplier (Tukumbi, 2011). China-owned
Exim Bank granted a loan for Angola through a bilateral government agreement. The
bank extended credit flow supported by resource for the Angolan government and for
sustaining China’s business in Angola (Worldfolio, 2014).
The problem that emerged from this credit flow is the lack of locals’ participation.
This situation is due to the nature of ownership, not only from the infrastructure financing
mechanism, but also from the Chinese contractors themselves (Corkin, 2012). Corkin
(2012) later added that because of this situation, many Angola-based construction firms
and Angolan professionals feel that Chinese companies are given an immense advantage
due to the credit flow policies. This definitely produces disparity and hinders the national
development process since it has significant impacts on the country's competitiveness
level in international trade, resulting in the weakening of a country's sovereignty. Hence,
Angola has become more accessible to be controlled by a foreign power. The situation
aptly pictures the central concept of neocolonialism. In addition, systematic control of
Chinese business enterprises which conducted intentionally and indirectly also indicates
the presence of neocolonialist practices in Angola.
It is evident that Chinese companies or contractors, both state-owned and privateowned, are unlikely to increase local participation (Corkin, 2012). In contrast, Exim
Bank, which finances China's construction projects, is the actor who is obliged to control
prospective rates of job, services, and material acquisition in Angola (Corkin, 2012).
Nevertheless, Chinese companies have a negative reputation for refusing to employ local
workers and prioritising Chinese labours. Some independent estimates suggested that
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there are more than one hundred thousand Chines workers in Angola now (Tukumbi,
2011).
Figure 2. Number of Visas Issued for Chinese Nationals (2004–2007).
Year

Work Visas

Dependents

TOTAL

2007

22,043

57

22,100

2006

14,283

39

14,322

2005

1,952

18

1970

2004

192

49

241

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of Angola (2007). Retrieved 30 December 2020 from https://csis-websiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/080306_angolachina.pdf

The Ambassador of Angola to China, João Manuel Bernardo, publicly stated that
his consulate had issued more than forty thousand visas for Chinese Nationals in 2008
alone (Baah & Jauch, 2009). In a single project of Kilamba Kiaxi social housing
development in Luanda’s suburb, China International Trust and Investment Corporation
employed ten thousand Chinese workers and only a small number of Angolans. This
state-owned enterprise built up to 710 apartment buildings, including its supporting
infrastructures, in a thirty-eight-month project worth US$3.53 billion (Corkin & Burke,
2006). The number of Chinese workers in Angola is going to be increased to twelve
thousand at the peak of the project. The most of Chinese labours in Angola are involved
in reconstruction projects. However, thousands have been observed expanding their
careers as real estate developers, retailers, photocopy shop owners, street vendors, or
masseurs (Brautigam, 2009). In the end, the Chinese presence ultimately dominates all
sectors of life in Angola.
Therefore, there has been an increase in dissatisfaction among Angolan labourers
regarding the intensified presence of Chinese business enterprises since it does not help
improve Angola's employment rate. Consequently, the situation has created tensions
between Angolans and the Chinese as resentment towards Chinese people has grown
among many Angolan people (Corkin, 2012), similar to Africans’ behaviour towards
colonial rulers during the colonial era. This is considered as one of the biggest criticisms
related to China's involvement in Angola and other African countries. It is noteworthy
that the Angolan government plays a significant role here since they are the ones who
authorise Chinese companies to majorly employ Chinese labours, instead of the locals,
to accelerate the infrastructure projects. It is evident that the Angolan government is more
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concerned about the short-term consequences of China's presence in Angola i.e.,
accelerating national development, public goods logistics, and increased foreign direct
investment. Meanwhile, the long-term result has been lost out of sight, especially related
to job vacancies for Angolan people and skills training for the residents. This condition
can be understood as China's method to 'buy' or influence the Angolan government in
terms of generating economic growth, as such change will mainly benefit the country's
corrupt leaders rather than Angolan people themselves (Corkin, 2012). Thus, this can be
attributed as one of neocolonialism's key instruments for economic influence as the
Angolan government 'provides' favourable treatment for Chinese enterprises.
Unfortunately, the government is also seen to make it difficult for residents and business
to participate in the process.
Figure 3. Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) (modelled ILO estimate) – Angola
1991-2020

Source: The World Bank (2021).

In financial terms, China does not impose strict controls on Angola's finances or
monetary. Angola, since 1977, has had its own currency called Kwanza and an
independent economic policy. Angola has also had its own monetary reserves named
Angola National Bank. China, however, has a way of influencing Angola's economic
policy indirectly. Since 2015, the Kwanza can and will be accepted by China nonetheless
(Forum China Plp, 2015). This actively demonstrates that Angola is now less dependent
on the dollar and thus allows for more imported goods from China. Furthermore, this
causes Angola to hold a monetary agreement with China by making China's currency,
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Yuan, as the second legal currency used in Angola (Agence Ecofin, 2015). This enables
China to exercise enormous influence in Angola.
Regarding China's foreign aid policy, a study from 2007 found that 66% of
Chinese aid contained credit or concessional loans, 5% of which was eligible for
cancellation of debt or donation and 29% were credited for government investments. The
study also found that 95% of all China's aid was based on the idea and provision that the
assistance was only used to employ Chinese workers and purchase of Chinese products
and equipment (Tukumbi, 2011). This factor can be associated with neocolonialism
because of its elements based on control possession and large influence, which refers to
prioritising Chinese labourers rather than local workers. Another factor that is related to
neocolonialist elements is the unfair agreement between Angola and China. For instance,
referring to the data stated before, China's assistance should only be used to purchase
Chinese manufactured goods, not locally manufactured ones. Moreover, most of China's
aid is concentrated on China-initiated development project in Angola which indicates the
neocolonialist aspect as China has direct physical control over these national
development contracts and plans. This notion of exercising control indirectly serves
China’s interests since they can force Angola to buy Chinese products and employ
Chinese workers (Sagoe, 2012). China's foreign aid policy, which can be considered as
an indirect form of what this paper calls as neocolonialism, is consequently correlated
with China's national interest.
Furthermore, foreign aid is firmly attached to the interests of donor countries
(Layton & Nielson, 2009). The empirical evidence shows that China provides more
foreign assistance to oil-rich countries in sub-Sahara, such as Angola, rather than to
countries with very few number of resources. Half of top ten China’s foreign aid
recipients within the last decade have provided China with various access to their oil
fields and contracts. China is said to be gaining crude oil in return (Amusa, 2016). Taking
this aspect into account, roads, railways, telecommunications, transportations,
government buildings, hospitals, and other energy and infrastructure sectors are now
being built and repaired in Angola, which accounts to 70% of China's aid. However, these
facilities only exist in places directly related to China's national interest and Chinese
workers, which must be hired by the African local companies in Angola as China's
preconditions of the assistance it provides. It can lead to more profound inequality in
access to jobs and services between Angolans and Chinese migrants. This too can be seen
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as a neocolonialist feature in expanding monopolistic access to certain area and business
(Sagoe, 2012).
The Angolan government has lifted some trade barriers for Chinese business,
offering promising incentives or tax reduction to fifty Chinese corporations in Angola
through The National Agency for Private Investment (ANIP), per December 2005. The
purpose of this tax cut is to promote private investment in Angola by providing foreign
countries, such as China, better conditions to invest in Angola (Baah & Jauch, 2009).
This eventually allows China’s economic domination towards multinational corporations
in Angola, as it is capable of isolating and discouraging small local business in Angola.
This neocolonialism trend consequently benefits the corrupt government in Angola and
the China’s government as well.
In 2009, the Angolan government decided to remove tariffs on imported
construction materials that would be used for the national reconstructions. As a result,
this regulation has lowered all construction costs in Angola and made Angola's local
construction materials challenging to develop (Corkin, 2012). Because China's major
exports to Angola are based on construction-related goods, such a decision has made
Chinese companies gain a considerable amount of profits in return (Sandrey & Edinger,
2010).
China has also expanded its market in Angola to sell its cheap manufacturing
goods. It has caused the collapse of many Angola’s local business as China’s business
enterprises has taken over the local market. This can be attributed to economic
domination within neocolonialism since the stronger states, like China, can interfere in a
country's national economy by maintaining flows of goods, with price and conditions
favouring China. Several Chinese corporations which have been permitted to operate in
Angola, such as China Sonangol Engineering and Construction, China Sonangol Natural
Resource, China Sonangol Exploration and Production, and many others (Burgos & Ear,
2012), evidently neglect the basic safety and health regulations, environmental law, and
the welfare of local labours (Power & Alves, 2012). This is another example of negative
consequences of China's neocolonialism tendency in Angola—by exercising its
economic power. Powerful states can dominate and influence those in charge of power
in less-developed countries to manipulate legitimate laws. In return, those corrupt leaders
are promised favourable treatment.
“Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State
Financing from China to Africa” is a study conducted by Aid Data from Harvard
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University, Heidelberg University, and William & Mary College. The objective of their
study is to trace China's funding or aid to 50 African countries, including Angola, during
the 2000-2013 period. This study found that African countries which are the recipient of
Chinese aid or funding tend to vote in favour of China at the UN General Assembly
(AidData, 2015). This is interrelated with donor and recipient aspect, African countries
that receive funding assistance from China, will vote in line with the Chinese
government's interests.
One of China's top eight debtors in Africa is Angola, which has signed Chinese
Resources-For-Infrastructure (R4I) swaps. This mechanism allows China to take control
over its debtors' exports and trade flows. China is also said to be able to manipulate their
market because these debtors owe the Chinese government billions of dollars in natural
resources. However, new problems arose when the loan was given to Angola. The
country’s Economic Complexity Index (ECI) is not ranked by the three major credit
rating agencies, Fitch ́s, Moody ́s, dan S&P. Angola’s ECI further declined when they
decided to do business with China. Due to those factors, Angola has become the main
target for low-interest and risky loans for China, which would be paid off by offering
China most of their natural resources, instead of by cash that they have in low amount.
By doing so, China can capitalise on its prominent and vital role in Angola by gaining
control over Angola's substantive economy and crude oil resources, instead of genuinely
assisting Angola in pursuing its financial recovery (Kelly, 2017).
Massive Use of Economic Instruments by China based on Cooperation, Investment,
and Loans through Economic Diplomacy Practices
Since the end of the Cold War, the world economy keeps improving, leading to other
countries' economic stimulation. The advancement of information and technology,
increased cooperation between states, greater transparency of the government, and transboundaries movement of workers due to globalisation. Today's economic globalisation
has become an irreversible trend and no country can refrain from being involved in the
globalised world activities. Economic globalisation is a process of integrating the national
economy into a global economic system, one of which signed by an increase in the
openness of a country's economy to international trade (Fakih, 2002). These international
trade activities will affect the country's economic growth since all countries compete in
the international market (Todaro & Smith, 2006). The foundation of economic
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globalisation is the blurry line within the economic activities or market, both nationally,
and regionally. Nonetheless, as the world is getting more globalised, it becomes a process
that involves many more countries. This development has significantly increased the
degree of interdependence as well as intensified competition between countries not only
in international trade, but also in the financial, production, and investment fields.
Friedman (2002) argued that globalisation consists of three dimensions. First, the
ideological dimension or idea, namely "capitalism". It includes a set of values embedded
within, such as individualism, democracy, and human rights. Second, the economic
dimension which refers to free market, meaning there are no obstacles to the flow of
goods and services. Third, technological dimension, particularly technology of
information which may generate vague national borders so that the states seem to be
borderless. In the economy, globalisation phenomena generally can be seen from the
rapid growth of economic activities across countries conducted in various forms. There
are two forms of economic activities that are considered increasingly global, namely
international capital flows and trade flows (Zaroni, 2015). Therefore, globalisation, world
investment, as well as international trade are taking place simultaneously.
However, such a global economy trend also perpetuates neocolonialism, even
though it is not widely acknowledged. In Africa, at the beginning of the 21st century, Ali
Mazrui argued that globalisation is the new form of neocolonialism. Similar to how
neocolonialism is interpreted in diverse ways, Mazrui also illustrated how globalisation
allows itself to be the servant of ruthless capitalism, increase the vulnerability of remotecontrolled warfare, widen the disparity gap between the rich and the poor, and accelerates
environmental degradation (Mazrui, 2002). These negative perspectives of globalisation,
specifically about extreme capitalism, basically strengthen Michael Maduagwu’s
statement that globalisation is merely the last stage of worldwide economic domination
which begins with colonialism, through imperialism and now has reached the stage of
globalisation (Maduagwu, 1999). Moreover, Afisi (2011) also argued that globalisation
has been recognised as an imposition of specific cultures and system of values on other
nations with the aim of direct exploitation. This demonstrates that globalisation is indeed
an engine for spreading neocolonialist practices in African land.
In addition to the impact of the present globalisation, the focus of global attention
has shifted. In the past, one's power was solely determined by its military capacity, ability
to colonise other countries, and ability or influence to speak at the international level.
Meanwhile, today, to determine one's power, other elements must be put into account as
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well, such as its economic growth compared to other countries, how many allies it has,
its policies and attitudes towards foreign affairs, the moral level of its people, and the
greatness of its public health (Friedman, 2002). In sum, the excellence and strength of a
country are not merely seen through its materials possession and military capacity.
Instead, it also depends on its ability to influence other countries’ policies regarding
world phenomena.
This development is influential and is very much considered by China. China used
to represent the Third World, and that changed due to its economic robustness that has
made its position in the international level even more important. What has happened to
China now could trigger other countries to move towards the same path, including
Angola. The significance of economic growth, national interest accomplishment, public
opinion towards China, and other complex things that must be dealt with have pushed
China to utilise soft power at the domestic and international levels. This can be
exemplified by China's augmented economic incentives (Nye, 2004). For China, soft
power is the key to China's effort to spread its influence worldwide.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, China has expanded its relations with Angola
in many areas, such as finance, investment, trade, development assistance, transfer of
technology and training, tourism, and cultural exchange (Eberling, 2017). China can enter
Angola's territory easily because of Angola's need for funds and infrastructure, yet it is
rich in natural resources. On the other hand, China is flooded with cash, seeking greater
investment opportunities for its fast-growing private sectors that requires a large infusion
of natural resources to meet its economic growth (Taylor, 2007). The combination of
these respective assets and liabilities has cultivated a more profound interdependency
between China and Angola in the economic sector.
Figure 4. Projects funded by EximBank (Phase I).
Sector

Number of Contracts

Total Value (US$)

Health

9

206,100,425.42

Education

8

217,158,670.63

Energy and Water

8

243,845,110.58

Agriculture

3

149.753.214.00

Transport

1

13,840,468.00

Social Communication

1

66,905,200.00

Public Works

1

211,684,100.65

TOTAL

31

1,109,287,188.28
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Figure 5. Projects Funded by EximBank (Phase II)
Sector

Number of Contracts

Total Value (US$)

Health

1

43,805,500

Education

3

229,642,314

Energy and Water

3

54,006,958

Agriculture

1

266,847,509

Fisheries

3

276,307,189

Post and Telecommunications

4

66,905,200.00

Public Works

2

89,490,000

TOTAL

17

1,105,002,085

Figure 6. "Complementary Action" Projects of EximBank
Sector

Total Value (US$)

Health

159,413,272.36

Education

145,648,999.00

Energy and Water

76,450,000.00

Education and Health

1,660,415.00

Fisheries

40,000,000.00

Telecommunications

56,336,500.00

Public Works

65,500,000.00

TOTAL

545,009,187.18

Source: Ministry of Finance of Angola (2007). Retrieved 30 December 2020 from
https://www.csis.org/analysis/angola-and-china-pragmatic-partnership

Moreover, it is worth noting that China's involvement in Angola's domestic affairs
is not perceived as threats to Angola because China does not have a colonial legacy in
African territory (Haroz, 2011). African countries, therefore, consider China as an
African ally and savior that can be trusted in partnering to provide required funding
without any 'attachments'. Such confidence is optimally used by China to deepen the
exercise of its economic means to Angola.

Investment and Loan Assistance as Instruments Creating Angola’s Continuous
Dependency on China
China implements two ways to increase Angloa’s dependence: by providing development
assistance and by making a long-term investment so that the oil-supplying countries will
not easily interrupt the oil supply (Oktapiani, 2015). China's provision of development
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assistance to Angola is made through the Loan for Oil mechanism, which requires
creditors to pay with its oil reserves. Therefore, China's assistance for Angola is also
acknowledged as an oil-backed loan or the Angolan Model (Alves, 2010). For instance,
Angola has been paying its debt to China by exporting 10.000 barrels of oil to China per
day (Tukumbi, 2011).
All the Chinese economic diplomacy mechanisms are initiated and ran subtly
through the loan assistance mechanism. Of the five largest recipients of China's loans in
Africa, during the 2000 to 2014 period, only two were oil producers i.e., Angola and
Sudan. As it has previously stated, they received loans with oil as a condition to repay
(Vasquez, 2019). As a result, Angola became an African country that received the largest
loan from China during that mentioned period.
Figure 7. Top China’s Loan Recipients from Africa in 2000-2014.
Country

Billion US$

Angola

21.20

Ethiopia

12.30

Sudan

5.60

Kenya

5.20

DRC

4.90

Source: Vasquez (2019). Retrieved 30 December 2020 from
https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/3174?lang=en

China, with its rapid growth of industrialisation is undoubtedly in need of an
abundant oil supply to support its domestic industry. Hence, in 2011, China imported
large quantity of crude oil from Angola, which amounted to 5.1 million barrels per day.
However, due to increasing demand, the number grew about 6.3% since 2011 (Burgos &
Ear, 2012). At least in 2009, Bloc 15, 17, and 18 have been partially acquired by China.
The area is said to contain 3.2 billion barrels of oil reserves and is capable of producing
around 150.000 barrels per day (Oktapiani, 2015). Thus, to strengthen its relations with
African countries, China does it in three main ways i.e., investment, cooperation, and
assistance. In the Angolan oil bloc itself, China's present and activities include (Zhao,
2011):
a. Bloc 3/80: In 2004, Sinopec, a China’s oil company, attempted to obtain
production rights in Bloc 3/80. Sinopec’s offer also included EximBank credit
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worth US$2 billion. This helped to enlarge the deal with Angolan business
enterprises. Sonangol, an Angola’s oil company, decided to support Sinopec and
discontinued extending Total’s license.
b. Bloc 14: Also in 2004, Sonangol and Sinopec set up a joint venture, known as
Sonangol Sinopec International Ltd., in which they work together in the oil
production and refinement. Their activities further expanded to Bloc 15, 17, dan
18.
c. Bloc 15, 17, 18: Sinopec and other Chinese oil companies named China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), were granted exploration and production
rights in these blocs, working together with Sonangol and with other foreign oil
companies as well.
d. Bloc 18: Sinopec currently owns a 50% stake in Bloc 18, which was purchased
for US$2,46 billion in March 2010
e. Bloc 32: In 2009, CNOOC and Sinopec made a purchase of 20% of stake in Bloc
32 from Marathon Oil Corp worth US$1,3 billion.
However, this makes the Angolan economy highly dependent on and revolves
around hydrocarbons (oil and gas) and mining (natural resources). The oil sector
apparently accounts for 30% of the country’s GDP and constitutes 95% of their total
exports and 50% of what is considered as public income. Due to its high dependence on
the oil industry for export, Angola's economy has become increasingly vulnerable and
dependent on the price of this commodity. In addition, such condition can also lead to a
negative economic term, namely Dutch Disease (Muzima, 2017). Dutch Disease refers
to the negative side effect of owning abundant natural resources or generating revenues
from such commodities. This ultimately leads to a large influx of foreign currency into
Angola through foreign aid, FDI, or increased resource price, thus affecting other goods
sectors that can be traded (Zhao, 2014). Accordingly, this can significantly impact the
country's overall GDP and make it extremely volatile once oil price declines
(Investopedia, 2017). In addition, Leite and Weidmann (1999) found that the abundance
of natural resources tends to be followed by the corrupt behaviour of its officials.
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Figure 8. Angola’s oil production in 2008-2019.

Source: The Global Economy (2021). Retrieved 16 January 2021 from
https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Angola/

Figure 9. Destination of Angola’s Crude Oil Export in 2008-2018 (OEC, 2021).
Destination Country

Total

China

48.1 %

United States

15.8 %

India

8.86 %

South Africa

4.07 %

France

3.66 %

Spain

3.34 %

Portugal

2.81 %

Canada

2.68 %

Italy

1.54 %

Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) (2021). Retrieved 20 January 2021 from
https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ago

Since 1975, when MPLA was supported by the Soviet took over and declared
Angola's independence, China was not seen interfering with Angola's internal politics.
China's principles regarding non-intervention, anti-hegemony, and fights against
developed countries have become fundamental Chinese premises, especially in Angola.
These factors may favour dictator leaders, which is very oppressive in Angola since
Angolan elites highly value China's attitudes (Taylor, 2007). Nevertheless, it is essential
to note that Angola is well known for its persistent inefficiency, corruption, and poverty,
ranked 164 out of 174 in 2016 based on the corruption perception index (Transparency
International, 2016).
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To obtain funding from abroad, the Angolan Government has not met the loan
requirements in terms of transparency and good governance. Angola in this respect is still
struggling to implement such governance practices, which Western donors deem
necessary before such loans can be granted (Corkin & Burke, 2006). There are only a few
conditions that are conditions for Chinese investment in developing countries, namely
acceptance of the "one China policy" which requires the local government to sever
diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognise Taiwan as part of China's sovereign
territory, granting 70% of contracts funded by Chinese loans to Chinese construction
companies, as well as rights to exploit Angolan oil (Tukumbi, 2011). At a time when
Angola was experiencing financial problems, China came up with the characteristics of
preferential loans granted without these traditional conditions. In 2005, Angola decided
to take out a US$2 billion loan from China with the terms of the loan being that China
holds the rights to 10,000 barrels of oil per day and also that 70% of all contracts must be
awarded to Chinese companies (Tukumbi, 2011). China's strategy of lending large sums
of capital is closely related to better enabling the profits from exploitation of Angola's
natural resources and at the same time, increasing its own economic progress (Tukumbi,
2011). When understanding these features, it will be easier to understand the reasons why
China is so interested in providing loans to Angola without any of the harsh conditions
of Western loans.
Furthermore, Angola’s economy and welfare now highly depends on China as
China is the one who buy its oil and has supported Angola’s national infrastructure
development. China, as the main actor that finances Angola, is also the country that is
responsible for a third of Angola's GDP. China is currently Angola's largest trading
partner (OEC, 2016) as their total trade reached US$37 billion in 2014 (Macau, 2015), in
relation to their total trade balance during the same year of US$40 billion (Focus
Economics, 2017). This means China is responsible for receiving more than 40% of total
trade from Angola. From this point on, it appears that if China faces economic downfall,
demand of Angola’s resources—oil, gas, or copper—will consequently follow.
Furthermore, it will also affect in less China’s investment in Angola’s infrastructure as
well as in other areas. Hence, China can influence, control, and even hinder Angola’s
effort in national development. Any slowdown in China will have disruptive and severe
consequences for a country like Angola (Rotberg, 2015). As a result, Angola relies
heavily on financial support from China in the time of inflation, depreciation of the local
currency, and falling price of export products.
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The intensity of China's economic influence can be widely observed by referring
to China's factors of offering foreign direct investment to Angola so that Angola
essentially dependent on China considering the risky terms and preconditions of such
investment. Other rich countries have complained that Chinese corporation would
conduct its business by linking aid to exports activities regarding China's aid policies.
(Brautigam, 2009). Even though loans and credits provided are evident to benefit Chinese
companies in Angola more, rather than the locals, China’s strategy cannot be merely
understood as an abuse of development assistance. The rationale behind such an
argument is that the two countries have agreed on certain terms which comprise of
Chinese state-owned companies taking over most of the approved contracts (Brautigam,
2009).
Unfortunately, Angola’s debt, which was planned to be backed by its oil capacity,
is now estimated to have reached US$25 billion. Roderick Bruce, an energy analyst for
West Africa with HIS, said that the lower the oil price is, the greater the cost of paying
debt (George, 2016). China's loan repayments are believed to be tied to the price of oil
when it was negotiated. Angola, therefore, will have to ship more crude oil once its value
depreciates. Repayments will be more difficult as Angola production has slumped in
recent years due to a lack of investment in the country's aging offshore fields. Falling oil
price then leads to less profitable extraction.
Angola has found itself with shrinking amounts of crude oil to sell as more of its
oil export to China used as debt repayment. Consequently, it leaves little revenue to be
located for developing Angola’s oil sector.
Figure 10. Creditor’s Debt Shares in African Countries that are eligible for DSII.

Source: World Bank Data (2018). Retrieved 27 December 2020 from https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/china-theworld-bank-and-african-debt-a-war-of-words/
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As noted above, the number for China's official creditors' debt share for Africa is
distorted by Angola, where Chinese Banks believe that they have mitigated risks by
pledging their infrastructure loans to Angola. In return, Angola must export its oil to
China. Angola accounts for 31% of China’s debt share, and more than 41% of all African
debt repayments due to this year’s Chinese official loans, in countries that qualify for the
Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) (George, 2016). China Development Bank is
heavily involved in Angola’s debt. The data show that since 2011, the CDB has accounted
for 75% of all Angola’s loan provided by China bilaterally (Brautigam, 2020).
In addition, Angola’s economy is already controlled by China. Angola may go
through the same path as Zimbabwe, which will allow Yuan to be one of the country's
official currencies if it is unable to pay its debts to China. The result of such
neocolonialism is that the increase in foreign investment does not affect the national
welfare of the host country. It somewhat widens the gap between the less developed
countries and the developed ones. Likewise, oil extraction and export cannot function as
a machine to improve Angola's economy since extracted oil from Angola by Chinese
companies majorly shipped to China to be converted into manufactured goods, which are
resold to African consumers. There will be added values to the goods, which makes the
price even higher for Angolan people (Falola & Heaton, n.d).
CONCLUSION
The principles and dimensions of neocolonialism, as discussed earlier, are indirect
economic and political control by using economic and monetary means, such as
economic aid or investment. Also, it comprises of extreme dependency to impose control
and influence towards other countries. This is evident in the case of China's economic
diplomacy towards Angola. The conclusion of this research will be divided into a
concise model with brief discussion of each dimension that considered as part of the
neocolonialism and limited to the Angola case. This should be understood as a checklist
since its aim is to draw analytical conclusions about neocolonialism features in China's
relations with Angola.
Concerning political control in Angola, China has primarily followed their
concept of non-intervention. However, there are signs of support from China to the
authoritarian Angolan leader, dos Santos, and the new undemocratic constitution in
Angola from 2012. This research has traced Chinese companies' influence on local
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political affairs in Angola, resulting in ease of controlling Angola's internal affairs.
Following this, it can be seen a few neocolonialist tendencies which embedded within.
On the point of China’s economic influence in Angola, there are traces of the
neocolonialist influence, such as China's ability to systematically control and influence
the Angolan workforce and the local business market considering the factors mentioned
in the previous section of this research. There is also a noticeable tendency to control
much of Angola's resources. Thus, this research has described how China plays its role
as a creditor who provides loans to control other countries affairs. In the long term, such
relations may produce further negative side effects for Angola, concerning China's
involvement in Angola from an economic point of view.
In terms of financial dependence and monetary agreement between Angola and
China, it has enabled China to make Angola increasingly rely on imported goods
produced by China, compared to other countries. China can influence Angola to be less
dependent on the dollar. Angola’s economic development inevitably depends on the
extraction of its natural resources, thus its relationship with China has become more
critical considering China’s position as Angola’s largest trading partner in this sector. It
is also China that majorly buys Angolan resources and builds Angolan infrastructure.
China is also Angola’s most vital partner, as Angola pays its debts with resources, while
China provides them with more capital or loans by granting Angola a long period to pay
its debt. However, it increased the dependency of Angola on China. Thus, it will be easy
for China to control and prevent Angola’s ability to grow and develop. It can be
concluded that China is not considered as a coloniser. It is rather recognised as a
successful capitalist in Angola. China's relation with Angola is best explained by the
notion of mutual benefits, except for China's enormous economic influence and Angola's
high financial dependence. This, however, cannot be recognised as neocolonialism under
the established framework. Nonetheless, the relation between the two shows and offers
the readers the idea that there are features and traces of neocolonialism tendency within
a large extent of economic and financial spheres, especially when their intensity is
widely recognised.
Furthermore, China is also known for its lack of transparency regarding its
activities in Angola. This certainly has led to mistrust and suspicion to China. It is
believed that China has a great power agenda behind every action it takes. Ultimately,
China’s organised system of financial dependency and economic exploitation in Angola
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illustrates a simple pattern. This pattern consists of China providing aid packages, loans,
and spending large sums of money for infrastructure (FDI). In exchange, they expect to
receive valuable natural resources in the form of oil and gas. From Angola's perspective,
this indeed creates unfavourable circumstances for Angola's job prospective rate since
the projects do not empower local labourers and local business. China also renegotiates
the enormous debt and receives a special or favourable treatment, such as a trade
agreement, which may benefit China business enterprises and maintain China's influence
within the country.
In terms of influence, China uses several instruments, including FDI,
infrastructure spending, foreign aid, agreements, summits, loan packages, or trade deals.
The main objective of such practices is to exercise a significant influence on Angola's
various natural resources (Kelly, 2017). As mentioned, the pattern of China-Angola
relation is clearly demonstrating China's primary aims in Africa. China is involved
within each of the said instrument to some degree. Therefore, it is vital to understand the
long-term consequences of China's intensified presence in Angola's internal affairs and
in other African countries. By understanding and knowing the results of these studies,
the operationalisation of this theory has proven useful in discovering the features of
neocolonialism in Africa.
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